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Abstract
This paper presents a model that can account for, and explain, two well documented
empirical asymmetries characterising a worker’s reciprocity: negative reciprocity is
both stronger, and more persistent, than positive reciprocity. The stronger inten-
sity of negative reciprocity is driven by the worker being loss averse; the longer
persistence is driven by the slower adaptation of the worker to wage changes that
are perceived as unfair.
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“Pleasure is always contingent upon change and disappears with continuous
satisfaction. Pain may persist under persisting adverse conditions”
Frijda (1988, p.353)
1 Introduction
Employment relationships are based on a mutual understanding of fairness and reciprocity.
The seminal papers of Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and Yellen (1990) respectively predated
what have become known in the behavioural economics literature as positive and neg-
ative reciprocity: wage increases that are perceived as gifts are positively reciprocated
by increases in effort, while wage decreases that are perceived as unfair are negatively
reciprocated by decreases in effort.
Starting with Fehr et al. (1993), several experiments have been developed to investigate
the existence of such positive wage-effort relationship (see Fehr et al. (2009) and Esteves-
Sorenson (2017) for surveys). These studies have also been supported, and motivated by,
a large body of anthropological evidence (see Bewley (2007) for a survey).
The resulting evidence on worker’s reciprocity can be divided in two main findings.
First, the negative reciprocity response to unfair wage cuts is stronger than the posi-
tive reciprocity response to wages that are perceived as gifts. Second, in the context of
long-term employment relationships, the effort boost induced by a wage increase is only
transitory,1 while the drop in effort following a wage cut is much more persistent.2 Draw-
ing from the theoretical framework developed by Dickson and Fongoni (2016), this paper
presents a simple model of workers’ reciprocity that can account for, and explain, both
these asymmetries.
If workers are loss averse and use their most recent wage as their reference for fairness,
the loss generated by a wage cut looms larger than the gain induced by an equivalent-sized
wage increase, implying that their reciprocity response to wage cuts is stronger (Dickson
and Fongoni, 2016).3 Moreover, in subsequent periods, as workers ‘get used’ to their new
wage, any positive or negative reciprocity will eventually disappear.
That reference wage adaptation to past wages can explain the temporary nature of
worker’s reciprocity has been recently established by the models of Dickson and Fongoni
(2016) and Sliwka and Werner (2017). In particular, Sliwka and Werner (2017) also
provide direct evidence of this hypothesis, which is consistent with other evidence on
reference point formation (e.g. Koch (2017) and Herz and Taubinsky (2018)), and with
the notion of adaptation, or habituation, popular in social psychology (see Kahneman
and Thaler (1991) and Baucells and Sarin (2010)). However, these models cannot explain
the longer persistence of negative reciprocity.
1See for instance Gneezy and List (2006) and Sliwka and Werner (2017).
2See Kube et al. (2013) and Chemin and Kurmann (2014).
3See also Sliwka and Werner (2017) and Macera and te Velde (2018).
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Inspired by the “law of hedonic asymmetry” conjectured by Frijda (1988) and the
experimental findings of Arkes et al. (2008, 2010) and Baucells et al. (2011), this paper
contributes to this literature by formally establishing that, if workers adapt more rapidly
to gains than to losses over time, negative reciprocity is not only stronger, but also more
persistent than positive reciprocity.
2 Model
2.1 Worker’s Reciprocity
Consider a worker in a long-term employment relationship with a firm. The worker
is reference dependent and loss averse: at the beginning of each employment period t
the worker evaluates the wage received wt in relation to a reference ‘fair’ wage rt, and
subsequently decides on the utility-maximising level of effort et that will generate output
for the firm. A wage below the reference wage is perceived as unfair, while a wage above
is perceived as a gift.
Following the derivation of a worker’s ‘asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity’
by Dickson and Fongoni (2016, Theorem 1), the worker’s optimal effort function can be
expressed as
e˜t = e˜(wt, rt, λ) = e˜
n +
{
η[wt − rt] if wt ≥ rt
λη[wt − rt] if wt < rt;
(1)
where e˜n captures ‘normal effort’, that is, the level of effort that a worker would exert
when they are paid their ‘fair’ wage (note that e˜n is independent of wt); η is a scaling
parameter; and λ is the worker’s degree of loss aversion.4 The effort function in (1)
captures the essential features of a worker’s reciprocity. For a given rt, if the worker is
paid a wage above their reference wage, they will positively reciprocate this gift with
supra-normal effort e˜(wt, rt)
+ ≡ e˜t > e˜n; while if the wage is set below their reference
wage, they will negatively reciprocate this unfair wage by exerting sub-normal effort
e˜(wt, rt, λ)
− ≡ e˜t < e˜n.
2.2 Asymmetric Adaptation
Experimental evidence on the dynamics of reference points suggests that individuals adapt
more rapidly to gains than to losses over time (see Arkes et al. (2008, 2010) and Baucells
et al. (2011)). Inspired by this literature, this paper assumes that the worker adapts their
reference wage to the past wage as follows:
4An effort function with similar properties can be derived from the conceptual model developed by
Sliwka and Werner (2017) for the case in which the worker considers only the most recent wage change
relative to the reference wage (i.e. the worker has ‘short memory’ with respect to their emotional states
in the past).
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A1. (Asymmetric Adaptation). The reference wage rt evolves according to:
rt =
{
α+wt−1 + (1− α+)rt−1 if wt−1 > rt−1
α−wt−1 + (1− α−)rt−1 if wt−1 ≤ rt−1,
(2)
where r0 is given, and α = (α
−, α+) ∈ [0, 1]2 with α+ ≥ α−.
The parameter α denotes the worker’s subjective speed of adaptation. The higher α
the more weight is given on the past wage wt−1 relative to the last reference wage rt−1;
that is, a higher α implies a faster adaptation of the reference wage to the most recent
wage received. If α = 0 there is no adaptation while if α = 1 adaptation is immediate. If
α− = α+ = α ∈ (0, 1), then it will take more than one employment period for the worker
to adapt their reference wage completely to the past wage: i.e. adaptation will be partial,
but still symmetric. Finally, if α+ > α− adaptation will be asymmetric, and the worker
will adapt more rapidly to wage gifts (gains) than to unfair wages (losses) over time.
3 Asymmetric Intensity and Persistence of Reciprocity
Consider now an initial situation in which the employed worker is paid their reference
wage wt = rt and exerts normal effort e˜t = e˜
n. The analysis that follows characterise
the asymmetries in intensity and persistence of the worker’s reciprocity responses to
equivalent-sized wage rises and cuts. In particular, consider an unanticipated and perma-
nent wage change of ±X% in period τ ≡ t+ 1, so that the worker will be paid the wage
wτ = wt(1±X%) for all t ≥ τ . The following proposition establishes the dynamics of the
worker’s reciprocity response.
Proposition 1. Given a wage change in period τ = t+ 1:
a) if wτ > wt and α
+ ∈ (0, 1], then e˜τ = e˜(wτ , rτ )+ > e˜n and for all t > τ , rt ↗ wτ
and e˜t ↘ e˜n ;
b) if wτ < wt and α
− ∈ (0, 1], then e˜τ = e˜(wτ , rτ , λ)− < e˜n and for all t > τ , rt ↘ wτ
and e˜t ↗ e˜n.
Consider first the effort response in the period of the wage change: the worker posi-
tively reciprocates a wage gift with supra-normal effort e˜(wτ , rτ )
+ > e˜n; and negatively
reciprocates a wage cut with sub-normal effort e˜(wτ , rτ , λ)
− < e˜n. However, if the worker
is loss averse this effort response is asymmetric: the negative reciprocity response to unfair
wage cuts is stronger than the positive reciprocity response to wage increases perceived as
gifts. This property of the worker’s effort function (1) is recalled in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. (Asymmetric Intensity, Dickson and Fongoni (2016, Theorem 1)). If the
worker is loss averse: λ > 1, then
limw↗r e˜w(wτ , rτ , λ)−
limw↘r e˜w(wτ , rτ )+
= λ > 1.
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Next consider the dynamics of the worker’s reciprocity as established in Proposition 1
for all t > τ . First notice that due to reference wage adaptation, in both cases a) and b),
the worker will eventually adapt their wage entitlement to the new wage wτ , implying that
effort will eventually converge back to the normal level e˜n that preceded the wage change.
This result formally demonstrates that, if workers are characterised by adaptation as in
(2), reciprocity is essentially temporary. However if adaptation is asymmetric because
the worker adapts more rapidly to wage increases as opposed to wage cuts, then negative
reciprocity will be also more persistent than positive reciprocity.
Corollary 2. (Asymmetric Persistence). If adaptation is asymmetric: α+ > α−, then
the convergence of e˜(wt, rt)
+ ↘ e˜n is faster than the convergence of e˜(wt, rt, λ)− ↗ e˜n.
These theoretical predictions are illustrated in Figure 1, which plots the dynamics of
the worker’s effort function (1) in response to a wage change of ±10% in period τ = 1,
subject to reference wage adaptation (2) for a set of (α+, α−).5 As established in Corollary
Figure 1:
Reciprocity Dynamics
1, due to the worker being loss averse λ > 1, the negative reciprocity response to a wage cut
of 10% is two times stronger than the positive reciprocity response to an equivalent-sized
wage increase. Moreover, as established in Corollary 2, the slower the worker’s adaptation
to wage cuts, the longer the persistence of sub-normal effort. In fact, lower values of α−
mean that, even if the worker will eventually adapt to the lower wage, they will perceive
the loss induced by a 10% wage cut for longer, which implies that their negative reciprocity
response will be more persistent. The related dynamics of the reference wage is illustrated
in Figure 2.
5In this simulation: e˜n and η are set to 1; λ = 2; and w0 = r0 = 1.
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Figure 2:
Reference Wage Dynamics
4 Conclusions
This paper presented a simple model of workers’ reciprocity in which the negative reci-
procity response to wage cuts is not only stronger, but also more persistent, than their
positive reciprocity response to equivalent-sized wage rises. Moreover the analysis formally
established that the stronger intensity of negative reciprocity is driven by the worker be-
ing loss averse (Dickson and Fongoni, 2016), while the longer persistence is driven by the
slower adaptation of the worker to wage changes that are perceived as unfair.
The analysis of this paper highlights two additional avenues for future research. First,
in the spirit of Sliwka and Werner (2017), it will be interesting to design and conduct a
laboratory experiment to test for the predictions of Corollary 1 and 2, investigating the
dynamics of both positive and negative reciprocity subject to a variety of increasing and
decreasing wage profiles. Second, in the spirit of Dickson and Fongoni (2016) and Macera
and te Velde (2018), it will also be relevant to study the optimal wage policy of a firm
in response to these asymmetries, from both a positive and normative perspective. The
author has already started investigating in both directions.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. To prove this statement it is sufficient to show that for all t ∈
[τ,∞) the linear dynamical system for rt has a unique, and globally stable, steady state.
Express (2) as: rt+1 = (1 − αs)rt + αswτ = g(rt), rτ , wτ given, where s ∈ {−,+}. The
steady state is the value of r∗ such that r∗ = g(r∗), that is, r∗ = wτ . Global asymptotic
stability is readily established by noticing that (1 − αs) < 1. Hence: lim
t→∞
e˜(wt, rt, λ) =
e˜(wτ , r
∗, λ) = e˜n. 
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